Introduction
In seeking to explain the social, political and economic development of South Korea since liberation in 1945, many scholars have begun paying increasing attention to the significance of Korea's colonial past.
1 Most of these scholars have, for very good reasons, focused on fundamental-even revolutionary-changes in Korea's institutional structure, which for centuries had been dominated by a landed aristocracy 'intent upon the preservation of its social, economic, and political privileges.' 2 Colonialism, to be more specific, replaced the factionalized and conflict-ridden institutions of aristocracy (and dynastic rule) with a modern, highly centralized, and extremely capable state apparatus, one which was used to reshape Korean society in any number of ways during Japan's 35 years of domination.
3 The 'strong state' is, in fact, an enduring and undeniably powerful legacy of colonialism. Its influence on post-liberation Korea was both profound and pervasive. A strengthened state, however, was not the only
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institutional legacy of the colonial period. Japan also introduced to Korea a peculiar brand of 'planned capitalism,' which, as Jung-en Woo persuasively argues, provided South Korea's post-1961 leadership with a workable, highly effective and efficient model for rapid industrialization. 4 There is, in other words, increasingly little doubt that the (state-dominated) institutional framework created by the Japanese played a central, if not defining role in South Korea's subsequent social, economic and political development. None the less, there remains a significant void in the literature dealing with the impact of colonialism on post-liberation South Korea. Namely, there has been virtually no appreciation for the physical and 'human' legacies of colonialism. The reason for this is easy to discern: with near unanimity, scholars agree that the resources left behind (or developed) by the Japanese-while extensive and extremely valuable-were dissipated through years of neglect, incompetence, and/or wartime destruction. In this view, there is little reason to assert that such resources had any lasting impact on South Korea's economic, social and political development. Yet, as I will show in the first part of this paper, there is good reason to doubt this assessment. Indeed, I argue that the physical and human legacies of colonialism constituted a significant and enduring 'inheritance' to South Korea-but not for reasons that are immediately apparent.
Briefly stated, I argue that Japan's development of Korea's physical and human resources during the colonial era resulted in (1) an extreme distortion of Korea's economic system, in which a handful of large-scale, relatively modern industrial enterprises were thrust upon a still primarily agrarian economy; and (2) a highly skewed distribution of entrepreneurial and (higher-level) managerial ability among native Koreans. The combination of these two factors had an easily discernible (but generally unappreciated) consequence: i.e., it allowed a small group of native Korean capitalists-in only a few short years-to monopolize and control most major industries in the South Korean economy. This rapid and almost complete domination of the economy both reflected and reinforced the structural power of a new-but highly exclusive-class of industrial elites. Understanding the structural basis of this power is critical, for it undergirds the broader, more theoretically significant argument of this paper, namely, that transitions in political regimes (even from an ostensibly 605 democratic to authoritarian one) did little to change the underlying nature of state-capital relations in South Korea. It is from this basis, I contend, that any examination of the political, economic and social development of South Korea must begin.
The Physical and Human Legacies of Colonialism
A Heritage Denied? Jones and Sakong provide, perhaps, the most generally accepted account of the colonial period's physical and human legacies. 5 Briefly put, for Jones and Sakong, the physical and human resources left to Korea constituted a 'heritage denied.' Their choice of wording is instructive, for it implies that the physical and human capital of the colonial period-if they had been used productivelywould have constituted a significant inheritance. There is little doubt that this is true. The authors note, for example, that a substantial legacy was left in several areas, including: the entire Japanese productive machinery (along with an impressive infrastructure of communications and transportation); 6 a small, but significant, pool of professional managers and/or technically-skilled laborers; a less quantifiable, but still critical introduction to modern technology and industrial organization; and a nascent (albeit Japanese-dominated and controlled) exposure to export-orientation industrialization.
physical inheritance had not already been lost through years of 'political maladministration' and neglect. There is, in fact, no doubt that the war had a tremendously negative impact on South Korea's productive capacity. In 1950, for example, South Korea's GNP dropped 15.1% and another 6.1.% in 1951. By war's end, the authors note, some 45% of industrial enterprises nationwide suffered 'substantial damage,' while in Seoul over 80% of industry, public utilities and transport were said to have been damaged or destroyed. Overall, the damage inflicted upon agriculture, transportation, and industrial facilities in the South amounted to some $3 billion (a figure equivalent to almost two times South Korea's GNP in the year prior to the Korean War). From this perspective, it is not at all difficult to conclude, as Jones and Sakong do, that the physical and human legacies of the colonial period had little impact on South Korea's subsequent economic (and sociopolitical) development. 9 Significantly, Jones and Sakong do not contend that the profligate handling of physical resources-specifically, vested enterprises-was entirely or even mostly due to a lack of competent manpower. As they point out, '[y]ears of ''learning by watching'' seem to have allowed many Koreans to step up to supervisory and technical jobs when the situation demanded.' 10 This is an important observation for it indicates that at least some Koreans possessed the ability and skills needed to assume positions of responsibility in modern industrial enterprises. (I should point out, however, that this is not the same as possessing entrepreneurial or even managerial ability, which, for reasons that will become clearer as I proceed, is an important distinction to keep in mind.) The authors argue, then, that South Korea's abysmal economic performance in the decade or so following liberation was due primarily to 'political' factors, and not to manpower shortages per se. On this point they are most likely correct. Still, it is important that we not unquestioningly accept the more general conclusions made by Jones and Sakong-i.e., that 'politics,' combined with wartime destruction, completely dissipated the physical and human legacies of colonialism. Indeed, it is not at all difficult to uncover evidence that, at the very least, problematizes this argument. For example, a cursory examination of the statistics regarding the disposition of vested enterprises before, during, and after the Korean War reveals an interesting fact: of the 2,029 vested enterprises sold during this period, 11 less than 7% (based on value) were disposed of by the end of 1952, by which time the most destructive phase of the war had ended.
12 Moreover, just one eighteen-month period between July 1955 to December 1956 accounts for over 50% of all vested enterprises sold during the entire period from 1946 to 1958 (see Table 1 ). The figures are not quite so skewed in terms of the number of cases (as opposed to value), but still indicate that the 11 Not all vested enterprises were sold. Some, for example, were dissolved, classed as 'non-vested' or designated as a branch.
12 Interestingly, Jones and Sakong point to a much higher figure. Citing a report issued by the United Nations Command (Office of the Economic Coordinator), the authors state that, in 1953 '. . . two-thirds of the enterprises (in value) had been sold' (italics mine, Jones and Sakong, Government, Business and Entrepreneurship, p. 35 war did not wreak as much havoc on vested enterprises as is generally assumed.
Even if it is true that a substantial portion of Japan's physical resources were not destroyed, either before or after the Korean War (which certainly seems to have been the case), this does not mean that they played a significant economic role in South Korea's early development. In this respect, a number of obvious questions come to mind: Did mismanagement, corruption and/or continued political in-fighting eventually destroy the bulk of vested enterprises after they were sold (or render them useless as on-going productive enterprises)? If not, in what way did the acquisition of vested enterprises provide the means to build dominant economic positions, not just in a single market, but within and across various industrial sectors? Just as importantly, what were the criteria for determining who would take over what properties? More specifically, was the distribution of vested enterprises based on purely 'political' considerations, like corrupt ties to the Rhee administration (as is generally implied)? Or, were other factors-such as managerial expertise or entrepreneurial ability-the main criteria? While it is difficult to answer these questions in any depth here (to do so would require a separate thesis), 13 there is strong evidence to indicate that (1) vested enterprises not only survived as viable productive facilities, but, more significantly, served as a significant and enduring basis of social and economic power for a select group of individuals; and (2) 'corruption' played, at best, a secondary (or epiphenomenal) role in the distribution of vested enterprises.
The Economic Significance of Vested Enterprises: Jones and Sakong, themselves, point to several cases in which formerly Japanese-owned enterprises provided the foundation for the development of some of Korea's largest business groups (or chaebol), including Doosan, Sunkyong, and Korea Explosives.
14 More generally, in a detailed 13 A few Korean scholars, however, have examined this question in some detail. Y. S. Kim, for example, studied the impact of sales of vested enterprises on, as he put it, 'the creation of industrial capitalists in South Korea'. See Kim Yun-su, '8.15 ihu swisok kiopch'e pulha-e kwanhan yongu (A study on the sales of ''vested enterprises'' in South Korean after 15 August 1945),' Ph.D. diss., Seoul National University, 1988, p. 88. Kong provides a broader analysis, as he examines the relationship between major government policies (the disposition of vested enterprises as well as the allocation of foreign aid) and the formation and subsequent growth of large capitalists in Korea during the 1950s. See Kong Che-uk, 1950-nyondae hanguk-ui Table 2 indicates, in only three of these 23 cases did vested enterprises play little or no role at all. It is not difficult to understand why former Japanese-owned factories played a central role in the early development of so many of South Korea's largest businesses: with an almost total lack of domestic capital, 16 vested enterprises represented one of the few ways for Koreans to 'invest' in industry (beyond the level of traditional household production). This was particularly true in the years before the Korean War, since, prior to then, most foreign aid (which was the only other significant source of capital for industrial investment) was of the 'non-project' variety (i.e., it was used to purchase consumption, rather than capital goods). 17 Of course, this tells us nothing about how vested enterprises were used or how productive they were. Fortunately, on this point, too, it is not difficult to find evidence to support the notion that many functioned as on-going, productive enterprises.
Rather than examine this issue at a general level, however, it might be better to focus on a specific industry-one which was not only heavily influenced by vested enterprises, but one which also played a central role in South Korea's post-liberation economy: cotton textiles. 19 Cotton production represented about 80% of total production in these factories, while silk and wool constituted the bulk of the remaining production (Voice of Korea, 16 July, 1949) .
Development of the Cotton
20 United States Armed Forces in Korea-National Economic Board, South Korea Interim Government Activities, no. 28 (November-December, 1948) , p. 7. important than the overall number of factories, however, was the industry's share of total manufacturing, which was quite significant. Under colonial rule, for example, textiles (including cotton, wool and silk) grew to be one of the country's largest industries, accounting for between 15 to 20% of total industrial production (for all of colonial Korea) in the 1930s. 21 The importance of the textile industry to the southern half of Korea was even greater, however, since the bulk of heavy and chemical industrial production took place in the north (see Table 3 ). Specifically, for the southern part of Korea, textile production constituted 23.4% of industrial production in 1940, which made it the second largest industry in the South-behind food processing (28.4%), but much higher than the third-place industry, chemicals (which accounted for about 14% of industrial production). examination of the relevant statistics makes this clear. 23 In the first year of liberation, for example, production of cotton yarn and cloth dropped drastically to just 10.7 and 9.3% of the 1938 highs of 82.4 million pounds and 236.1 million yards respectively. Beginning in 1946, however, one mill after another resumed operation, most of which were leased (rather than sold) to Koreans under the auspices of the USMGIK (United States Military Government in Korea). Led by the seven former Japanese-owned companies plus Kyungbangthe only large-scale, Korean-owned textile firm in the colonial period 24 -output and productive capacity steadily increased. By 1949, a 'normal stage of operation' was reached, and by early 1950 (just prior to the onset of the Korean War), annual output reached a respectable 28.2 million pounds for cotton yarn and 64.2 million square yards for cotton cloth.
25 While this level of production was still small in comparison with pre-liberation production, it was sufficient to meet domestic demand. During this period, domestic firms also significantly expanded their production capacity: in 1949, the industry had 304,500 spindles and 9,000 looms installed, representing a net increase of over 50,000 spindles. Korea's First Republic, 1948 -1960 26 Ibid. The gross figure is much higher, since a large number of outdated spindles had to be replaced. According to the Spinners and Weavers Association of Korea (Taehan pangjik hyophoe; hereafter, SWAK), a total of 86,076 spindles (for 13 mills) were installed during this same period. Of this gross amount, the seven 'vested enterprises' accounted for almost 25,000 (SWAK, Panghyop samsip nyon-sa [Thirty-year history of the Spinners and Weavers Association] [Seoul: SWAK, 1977] , p. 238). It must also be mentioned, however, that the installation of new spindles was made possible because, during the Pacific War, Japan had moved, but not installed, 83,500 spindles and nearly 1,000 looms to Korea. These spindles remained in Korea following liberation and were eventually installed in Korean mills (ERCK, Industrial Structure of Korea, p. 100).
27 SWAK, Cotton Textile Chart 63 (Seoul: Spinners and Weavers Association of Korea, 1963).
paralysis. The numbers for other formerly Japanese-owned cotton mills were not as high, 28 but still acceptable given serious shortages of raw materials and electrical power. This latter point is important to highlight, for, in pointing out that only 20% of vested industry was operating in the two to three years after liberation, most scholars fail to take into account the tremendous difficulties caused by raw material and electrical power shortages. Yet, it is fairly clear both had a significant impact on South Korean industry. After all, the departure of the Japanese not only entailed the sudden exodus of thousands of managers and skilled technicians, but also abruptly cut off South Korea's access to resources in the North and from the rest of the Japanese empire. It is well known, for example, that North Korea was not only the dominant source of electrical power during the colonial period, but also possessed most of the country's mineral deposits (including iron ore, anthracite coal, and gold). Moreover, during the Second World War, South Korea's reliance on imports of raw materials (such as raw cotton and sugar) increased substantially; thus, when the end of the war came, it was only natural that South Korean factories would struggle to keep production at high levels.
There is some evidence, moreover, to indicate that this was the case. One early survey of Korean industry, for example, noted that of 390 non-operating factories in 1946, almost 70% had shut down due to a lack of raw materials. 29 In the case of the cotton textile industry, the proportional figure was even higher: 46 of 56 mills were unable to operate due to a lack of raw cotton (see Table 4 ). The situation in the cotton textile industry, I might note, was exacerbated because domestic producers had, until 1945, been able to acquire most of their raw cotton locally. Due to intensive efforts on the part of colonial officials, domestic production of raw cotton reached a high of 320 million pounds in 1943. By 1945, however, domestic production dropped to virtually nothing as almost all cotton fields were converted back into rice paddies and other grain fields in an attempt to cope with an acute food shortage on the Japanese 28 For example, in the same year, Tongyang Spinning Co. was using slightly more than 50% of its operable spindles and running an average of 8.6 hours a day; the respective figures for Chǒnnam Spinning Co. were 68% and 13.35 hours; and for Panpon Spinning Co. 40% and 9.7 hours (ibid. mainland. 30 Thereafter, domestic production of raw cotton never recovered-the little that was produced was used mostly for home consumption. Imports of raw cotton only gradually took up the slack-and then only in quite erratic fashion. In 1947, for example, imports (financed almost entirely by American foreign aid) totaled 33,632 bales of cotton, but decreased slightly the following year. In 1949, imports jumped to 60 thousand bales, but fell to 49 thousand the next year.
31 Table 5 provides additional details on trends in domestic production, collection, and imports.
In spite of the difficulties of obtaining raw materials, the prospects for the cotton textile industry were quite good. Indeed, on the strength of the industry's fairly rapid and strong recovery, an ambitious plan for 1950 was developed, the main objective of which was to boost that year's output by more than 40%. Unfortunately, the outbreak of war not only wrecked these plans, but set the industry back many years.
32 But, while the Korean War hit the industry hard-about 70% of existing facilities were severely damaged or destroyed 33 -it is important to note that only two major cotton spinning factories were completely destroyed: Cheil Spinning Co. and 30 This process of reconversion actually began in the early 1940s, when Japanese officials ordered farmers in Korea to increase grain production in order to cope with food shortages on the Japanese mainland. 31 After the Korean War, however, imports of raw cotton, financed with U.S. aid money, came pouring into South Korea. In 1953, Korea received $3.17 million in aid to import raw cotton; in 1954, this jumped to $17 million and increased steadily until 1958, reaching a high $31. 32 Production of cotton yarn dropped to 13 million pounds, while only 30 million yards of cloth was produced in 1951. Ibid. 33 For the ten largest mills, losses totaled 218,000 spindles and 5,700 looms. The loss on inventory amounted to about 4,700 bales of raw cotton yarn and 9.3 million yards of cotton cloth (ERCK, Industrial Structure of Korea, pp. 103-4). 35 For just the remaining six Japanese-established cotton mills, the numbers were almost as impressive: from 85,142 spindles at the end of 1950, the number increased to 240,200 by 1960. Rapid recovery was also evidenced by the strong growth in output after the war, both for the Japanese-established cotton mills and the industry as whole. Output of cotton yarn among the six former Japaneseowned companies, for example, increased almost three-fold from approximately 20 million pounds in 1952 to 57 million pounds in 1960. During the same period, production of cotton cloth more than doubled, from about 41 million to 87 million yards.
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Although it is not possible to draw hard-and-fast conclusions based on this brief overview, the growth and development of the cotton 34 Many smaller factories were also destroyed, but their total productive capacity was fairly small. The largest, for example, had only 4,480 spindles. Overall, about 63% of all spindles were destroyed during the war, with all but one factory (Chosun) suffering some damage. In addition, seven cotton weaving factories were destroyed during the war (SWAK, Cotton Textile Chart). 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.
textile industry during the 1950s does open to serious question the assumption that the physical heritage of vested enterprises was completely 'denied.' Still, while the foregoing discussion provides a strong basis for challenging long-standing assumptions about the importance (or lack thereof) of the physical resources left by the Japanese, it is important that we keep this issue in broader perspective. That is, the significance of vested enterprises, as I suggested earlier, can only be fully understood in relation to the particular set of circumstances facing South Korea after liberation, one of which was the extreme concentration of entrepreneurial and managerial ability among a handful of native Koreans. The following section, then, will take a closer look at the development of entrepreneurship during the colonial period.
Development of Korean Entrepreneurship Under Colonial Rule
In 1904, there were only six Korean-owned factories with a combined capital of Y =60,000 and workforce of only 92. 37 Given Korea's traditional social structure, however, this was not at all surprising. 38 Thus, when Japan forcefully introduced the principles of 'free enterprise' to Korea beginning in 1904, the potential for a rapid increase in entrepreneurial activity (particularly in the manufacturing sector) was certainly present. Entrepreneurial activity among Koreans did, in fact, increase during the first few years of Japanese rule, but only marginally. This was due, in part, to the continuing influence of traditional values, but was also due to tight control exercised by the colonial government, both before and after formal annexation in
1910.
39 This is evidenced by the statistics on investments by Koreans 40 with an aggregate capital of Y =4.9 million. This small spurt of growth, however, was not sustained: over the next five years, the total number of Korean corporations remained the same (at 39), although the aggregate capital grew slightly, to Y =7.3 million.
Tight restrictions on Korean entrepreneurship (such as it was) began to change, however, toward the end of the first decade of colonial rule. Although Japan's 'Agriculture First' policy remained intact, the first wide-scale manifestation of Korean nationalism in 1919 (the March First Movement) encouraged the Japanese colonial authorities to pursue-albeit, for a limited period of time-a less repressive and restrictive policy toward Koreans. Part of this effort involved a relaxation of policies governing Korean economic activity. This included, most significantly, the repeal of the old Company Regulations Law and the enactment of a revised law, which only required that new corporations register with the government (rather than receive explicit permission). These revisions helped to spark a dramatic increase in the number of both Korean corporations and unincorporated factories. In 1919, for example, the number of Korean corporations increased from 39 to 63, and grew steadily thereafter: by 1929, there were 363 Korean corporations. 41 The numbers were even more impressive for unincorporated factories. In 1917, there were 605 Korean-owned factories; by 1921, this number had grown to 1,088, and by 1927 to 2,457.
42 It is important, however, that we not let these numbers obscure the fact that, for the most part, Korean-owned 'factories' remained extremely small, poorly financed, and technologically backward. On this point, the 1920 report by the it discouraged new investment (especially among Koreans). As a measure of how strictly the colonial government enforced this policy, consider that, in 1910, of 11 applications for incorporation, only two were approved (Chosen Residency General, Korean Reforms and Progress Reports 1907 -1911 [Seoul, 1911 , p. 39).
40 These included both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. Most of the non-manufacturing companies were banks, which was one of the few areas of 'business' that appealed to Korea's traditional aristocrats. Bank of Chosen provides a useful description on the state of Korean 'manufacturing': It has . . . been observed that [Korea's] . . . manufactures were mostly of a very crude nature, some being hardly worthy of the name, requiring neither a large capital nor great technical skill. This state of affairs will continue for a considerable time yet, seeing that articles requiring either or both of these for their manufacture can be imported from Japan with advantage.
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The tendency for Korean 'factories' to remain tiny and to confine production primarily to traditional or rudimentary manufactured goods, I should emphasize, was fully consistent with Japanese objectives. For, following the repeal of the Company Regulations Law, the Government-General's official policy was to encourage Koreans to operate only small-scale, craft-type industries utilizing local raw materials. Acceptable industries included: mats, lacquerware, willow ware, bambooware, traditional alcoholic beverages, animal oils, rice milling, etc.
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Forced Industrialization and Industrial Imbalance in the 1930s. By the end of the 1920s, then, it is fairly clear that the development of Korean entrepreneurship remained, despite some changes, severely limited. The 1930s, however, held out the promise of greater development, in large part because the Government-General was forced to change its strictly agriculture-based policy, and instead implement one designed to foster rapid industrialization. The impetus for this change derived from international/domestic forces that were having a deep impact on Japan: a serious agricultural depression caused by overproduction of rice in Korea and Formosa (Taiwan), and a military-related drive to develop the Japanese colonial empire as quickly as possible. For the most part this simply meant that Japan's large conglomerates (i.e., the zaibatsu) would accelerate their expansion into Korea, especially in heavy industries. In this regard, I should note that Korea possessed a number of significant advantages for the development of heavy industry, such as an abundant capacity to generate hydroelectric power, a cheap labor force (which was, by this time, fairly well-trained in Japanese customs and language), a strategic location in the empire, etc.
45 Thus, it is not surprising that Korea's industrial transformation proceeded at a quick pace. Between 1930 and 1935, for example, heavy industry's share of industrial production in Korea jumped from 23.1% to 37.2%; five years later, the figure was 50.3%. (During this same period, manufacturing's share of net output grew from around 13% to 24%.) The impact on the number of manufacturing firms was even greater, as the total increased to nearly 15,000 by the end of 1943.
Still, in spite of the rapid pace of industrialization, Korean participation remained extremely limited, particularly in terms of scale. Of 128 companies in Korea with paid-in capital of more than Y =1 million (in 1936), for example, only 19 were owned by Koreans, and only two of these were industrial companies-Kyungsung Textile Company (also known as Kyungbang) and Chosun Flour Company.
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By 1940, the situation had improved, but not by much. Of total paid-in capital, the amount invested by Koreans was only 6% of the total. With only a few exceptions, then, the relatively rapid growth of Korean business in the 1930s continued to be one of quantity, not scale. Moreover, as we have seen, this was especially the case in manufacturing, where, of the thousands of Koreans who opened their own factories from the 1920s to the early 1940s, only a handful were able to move beyond the most rudimentary technical, managerial or financial levels.
Here, it is important to note that those who achieved the greatest success under the Japanese were not necessarily in the most advantageous positions following liberation. This was true for two reasons. First, their success was generally tied to cooperation (viz. 'collaboration') with colonial officials. In the vehemently antiJapanese environment of post-liberation Korea, this was a definite (though not fatal) drawback. Second, the most successful capitalists of the colonial era, in general, ended up on 'wrong side' of the struggle for political control following the departure of the Japanese. Thus, their access to the physical and financial resources and privileges controlled by the postcolonial state was (although not completely cut-off) limited, which, in the relative poverty of the 1940s and 1950s, was a severe disadvantage. This may help to explain why, with a few exceptions, the largest Korean industrialists in the 620 colonial period did not achieve a great deal of economic success after the departure of the Japanese in 1945. At the same time, it may also explain why a number of 'petit capitalists' did. Of this select group, the most significant were Lee Byung Chul of Samsung, Although exceedingly small in number, the impact these few capitalists/entrepreneurs had-both as individuals and as a group-on Korea's subsequent economic growth and development is hard to understate. Indeed, from an admittedly crude statistical perspective, it is easy to see that their role has been immense. For example, in 47 Lee got his start as a provincial businessman under the Japanese, beginning with the establishment of a rice mill in 1935 (when he was just 26 years old). By the time of liberation, however, Lee had expanded into trucking, real estate, trade, noodle-making, and brewing-all of which made him quite successful compared to most other Korean entrepreneurs. 48 Chung is perhaps Korea's best known businessman. Like Lee, he was a fairly successful entrepreneur during the colonial period. He got his start as a rice peddler, but was forced to abandon that business after Japan entered the Second World War. Chung notes, however, that when the rice business was forbidden, he looked for 'something else to do that did not require large capital but would yield high returns.' Chung's choice was the auto repair business. Although Chung was ultimately forced to give up his auto repair shop as well (it was merged with a Japanese steel plant), it proved to be a valuable experience, as he used it to develop his first connections with the U.S. 49 Park used the business experience he gained under the tutelage of his father (Pak Sung-jik) to build a large business group around his acquisition of the Oriental Brewery in 1952.
50 Kim began his entrepreneurial career in 1939, when he established a soap factory. 51 Although not an 'entrepreneur' during the colonial period, Kim was perhaps the only Korean to achieve a management-level position in a large, Japanese-owned company. Not surprisingly, Kim used his knowledge and expertise to take over the same company when the Japanese left Korea. 52 Ku got his start in 1931, when he opened a dry goods store with Y =2,000 borrowed from his father. Like Lee Byung Chul, Ku quickly expanded his operations and, by Korean standards, was fairly successful during the colonial period. 53 Cho was not particularly successful as a businessman during the colonial era, although it was not for lack of effort or talent. The problem, instead, was his choice of industry: industrial machinery. Unfortunately for Cho, the machinery industry was totally dominated by the Japanese, who, not surprisingly, were not anxious to see native Koreans enter this sector. Cho's technical and mechanical training, however, served him well after liberation as he quickly entered the transport industry (his first major customer was the U.S. military). By 1956, in fact, Cho's company, Hanjin, was the primary transporter for U.S. military cargo in Korea. Under Park, Cho acquired Korean Airlines (KAL), which is the group's flagship company today.
1990, the eight business groups mentioned above (Samsung, Hyundai, Doosan, Sunkyong, Ssangyong, Korea Explosives, LuckyGoldstar, and Hanjin) accounted for 61.6% of total sales, 50% of total assets, 57% of paid-in capital, 47% of net worth, and 41% of net income for the top 50 groups in South Korea. 54 It did not, however, take 30-plus years for these capitalists/entrepreneurs (as well as few others) to establish imposing economic positions in South Korea-most were able to build large and often market-dominating positions only a few years after liberation. 55 Some, like Pak Doobyung, Kim Sung-kon, Chey Chong-hyon and Kim Chung-hee relied on their acquisition of vested enterprises as a foundation for their business empires, while others, like Lee Byung Chul and Ku In-hoe, took advantage of the other major source of economic privilege in post-liberation Korea: foreign aid.
56 (I might add that one can even attribute to colonialism the extraordinary level of foreign aid that flowed into the country: Japan's occupation of Korea not only led to its division, but allowed the South to reap huge benefits as a bastion of anti-communism during the Cold War.) Whatever the source of their capital, however, virtually all of Korea's most successful capitalists/entrepreneurs (at least prior to 1960) developed and honed their skills during the colonial period. In retrospect, this is a fairly obvious observation; still, most scholars have utterly failed to appreciate the social, political and economic significance of the skewed development of entrepreneurship. It is to this issue that I will turn next.
Political Capitialists or Capitalists in a Political World?
It is generally assumed that South Korea's most successful entrepreneurs of the Rhee era (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) were purely politically-54 All figures cited are adapted from statistics compiled by the Korea Management Efficiency Research Institute, and include financial companies owned by each of the chaebol (in Korea Infoserv, Korean Business & Industry Yearbook [Seoul: Korea Infoserv, 1990] ).
55 For reasons of space, it is not possible to detail the early accomplishments of South Korea's most successful capitalists/entrepreneurs. Suffice it to say, then, that (by the early to mid-1950s) most had already established monopolistic or oligopolistic positions in major markets throughout South Korea, including textiles (cotton and wool), cement, flour, sugar, industrial explosives, plastics, electronics, transportation, rubber tires, sheet glass, industrial machinery, banking, insurance and foreign trade. For further details, see Lim, 'Competition, Markets and the Politics of Development in South Korea,' Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii at Manoa (December 1996), pp. 181-205 and 321-9.
56 A third group, including Chung Ju-yung and Cho Choong-hun built their original fortunes from contracts with the U.S. military. created creatures, unable to stand, much less prosper, on their own. 'Entrepreneurial success,' in other words, is said to have been primarily the result of a corrupt quid pro quo between the state and socalled political capitalists, whereby access to vested enterprises (which were typically acquired at below market prices and on extremely favorable terms) 57 and to foreign aid (or aid-financed projects) was only given to loyal supporters of Rhee. Those who received such access, more importantly, were then in a position to reap huge monopolistic profits and to become, virtually overnight, business 'tycoons.' In this view, entrepreneurial and/or managerial acumen counted very little, since the main criterion for economic success was political loyalty, combined with a willingness to provide kickbacks, under-the-table payments, and bribes to Rhee and members of the ruling party. While not entirely inaccurate, this argument is, in a causal sense, backward. That is, rather than entrepeneurial success being a function of corruption, it is more likely the case that success in business provided the basis for certain capitalists/entrepreneurs to develop collusive ties with the government. This is not a trivial distinction. For, if true, it indicates that the power to make critical allocative decisions was not, as most scholars assume, a prerogative of the state. Rather, it indicates that certain capitalists could not only influence, but, to a certain extent, direct the flow of (government-controlled) resources into their own hands. Before discussing this important issue, however, it is necessary first to address the (causal) relationship between economic success and corruption during the Rhee years.
In the operation of textile mills, we have already seen some evidence that the disposition of vested enterprises was not based purely on corruption or collusion. 58 The fact that these relatively modern industrial enterprises were not simply run into the ground demonstrates (albeit does not prove) that the individuals who took them over did so as much on the basis of economic ability, as on the basis of political connections. Indeed, it is readily apparent that at least some textile factories (whether cotton, wool, or silk) were taken over by those individuals who were most qualified to do so. The founder 57 Many properties were financed with long-term (up to 15 years), low-interest loans. Given the country's high rate of inflation, however, the real price on many vested enterprises ended up being almost nothing. 58 McNamara discusses this issue at length with regard to the development of the cotton textile industry during the Rhee years. See McNamara, 'State and Concentration.' of the Sunkyong Group, Chey Chong-hyon, is a particularly good example of this. During the colonial period, Chey worked as a technician in a Japanese-owned textile firm. Following liberation, he immediately took over the same factory as acting manager, and, in 1953, purchased the plant outright. Chey used this factory, I might also note, to lay the foundation for his eventual expansion into synthetic fibers and polyester film manufacturing, which is a further indication that his initial acquisition was not based entirely on political influence. (In 1990, Sunkyong was Korea's fifth largest business group, based largely on the purchase, in 1980, of Yukong Ltd, the country's largest oil refinery.) In this case, then, it is unequivocal that Chey's expertise not only gave him an advantage over others who may have wished to purchase the plant, but made good economic (as opposed to political) sense.
To see that individuals who acquired vested enterprises in the textile industry were not purely 'political creatures,' we can also look at their activities following the Korean War, when, as I noted earlier, many of the largest textile factories were severely damaged or destroyed. If these factories had been run by politically astute, but economically incompetent men (whose sole purpose was to make a quick profit), it is unlikely that they would have been able so easily to recover from the calamitous consequences of the war (still less, willing to do so). But many did. For example, the owner of Kumsung Textile Company, Kim Sung-kon, not only wasted little time in constructing a new factory after his was destroyed during the war, but, by 1956, had become South Korea's largest cotton textile producer (in part, through the acquisition of two other textile companies, Taepyong and Aju). Kim, I might note, also expanded into publishing, insurance and international trade shortly after the Korean War. Later, in 1962, he moved into the cement industry with the establishment of Ssangyong Cement Co., and, in 1967, sold his textile operations to finance the construction of another cement factory. From this-admittedly quite brief-description of Kim's entreprenurial history, it is reasonable to conclude that, like Chey, Kim's acquisition of a former Japanese-owned factory was based on his managerial and entrepreneurial acumen, and not necessarily on any political connection he may have had with the Rhee regime. A similar argument can be made for individuals in other industries. When Kim Chung-hee took over Korea Explosives, for instance, it is clear that he did so on the basis of his ability to run effectively the factory in which he had once worked as a manager. This is also true of Park Doo-byung, who purchased Oriental Brewery-another large and valuable vested enterprise. (During the colonial period, Park was a minority shareholder in the parent Japanese company, Kirin, a major manufacturer of alcoholic beverages.)
In highlighting the accomplishments of these four capitalists/ entrepreneurs, my intention is not to romanticize their deeds, but to underscore the fact that the individuals who acquired former Japanese-owned enterprises-however 'sweet' their deal may have been-clearly possessed the requisite ability effectively to manage and operate them. This is not to say that no vested enteprises were acquired as a result of political influence (or collusive ties with the government), for this almost certainly occurred. The important point, rather, is that 'politics' was not the sole, nor necessarily the most important criterion in deciding who got what properties.
The story, I might note, is not substantially different for those capitalists/entrepreneurs who built their fortunes without the aid of vested enterprises. For example, Korea's two most prominent capitalists-Samsung's Lee Byung Chul and Hyundai's Chung Ju-yungboth achieved a considerable degree of success before taking advantage of any government-controlled resources. Shortly after liberation, for instance, Lee made the decision not only to leave his hometown, where he had built a formidable business presence, but to enter into a completely new line of business: in 1947, he moved his headquarters to Seoul and expanded into international trade, using funds he had accumulated from his brewery. According to Lee, his motivation for doing so was primarily 'patriotic': he saw it as his duty to invest in a business that would meet the 'urgent needs' of the nation.
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While one might question his actual motive, Lee clearly knew what he was doing: a few years after moving to Seoul, Lee's trading firm had grown to one of the ten largest companies in South Korea (based on sales).
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Hyundai's Chung moved with equal alacrity and success: in 1946 he re-established an auto repair shop (which he was forced to shut down during the colonial period). At first, Chung specialized in refitting surplus U.S. military vehicles; a year later, he added Japanese cars and soon had 30 people working for him (about half the number in his first business). of his entrepreneurial vision, Chung founded Hyundai Construction Company. Although his construction business started slowly and was still rather small before the outbreak of the Korean War, Chung (with the help of his brother) was able to develop crucial ties with the American army. These ties, in fact, were instrumental in Chung's early economic success. As Kirk explains it, Chung's initial connection with the U.S. Army allowed him to 'set about gaining a monopoly on 8th Army projects beginning with construction of an 8th Army headquarters.' Thereafter, Chung '. . . earned profits of 500% to 600% on his work on about 300 U.S. Army posts. . . .' 61 In this way, Chung was well on his way to economic prosperity before he received a dime (or hwan, as the case may be) from his own government.
Of course, both Lee and Chung eventually took full advantage of government-controlled resources (as did Korea's third most prominent capitalist, Lucky-Goldstar's Ku In-hoe). For example, Lee's most significant manufacturing company in the 1950s, Cheil Sugar, was entirely funded by foreign capital and government loans (to the tune of about $800,000). Cheil, I might note, was not only the largest sugar refinery in South Korea (with an annual capacity of 79,500 metric tons), 62 but was also the beneficiary of extremely profitable subsidies used to acquire raw sugar. 63 Lee's other major manufacturing company, Cheil Wool, was also built on the basis of foreign aid. Yet, it should not be surprising that Lee and others were able to take advantage of government-controlled resources. After all, they had proven themselves capable of doing what few other Koreans could: running successful businesses in the country's still chaotic and 'backward' capitalist economy. This, in fact, was their social basis of power. That is, in the context of South Korea's post-liberation capitalist economy, individuals who possessed a combination of entrepreneurial and capitalist talents were extremely rare. This accorded them a position (in structural terms) of tremendous privilege and advantage. The country, in other words, simply could not do without them.
In practical terms, this meant that the government was quite constrained in deciding who would get the resources over which it exercised ostensible control (unless, of course, government leaders were willing to see the country's economy collapse completely, which they 61 Kirk, Korean Dynasty, p. 70. 62 The next largest factory was Samyang, which had an annual capacity of 45,000 metric tons.
63 See ERCK, Industrial Structure of Korea.
were not). It is from this perspective that the causality of the conventional wisdom should be reversed: to reiterate, it was not a 'political connection' that allowed certain capitalists to gain access to government-controlled resources, but entrepreneurial and/or managerial ability. Indeed, even Rhee's political enemies (at least those who had proven entrepreneurial and/or managerial ability) were able to benefit from government support. As McNamara points out, Kyungbang, the textile company founded by Kim Sung-su (and his brother Kim Yun-su), received a good deal of direct financial support from the government throughout the 1950s (and, in general, benefited from infrastructural support provided to the industry as a whole) despite the fact that Kim was a thorn in Rhee's side and a leader in the main opposition party. 64 The inability of Rhee completely to withhold support from economically-significant political enemies was, in other words, a clear reflection of the structural power of capital in post-liberation South Korea.
To sum up, then, capitalists/entrepreneurs like Lee Byung Chul, Chung Ju-yung, Chey Chong-hyon, Kim Sung-kon, and Kim Chonghee (to name a few), were not passive agents who had no control over the disposition of South Korea's scarce economic resources. Quite the contrary. Because of the critical positions they occupied in the country's socioeconomic system, they were able to direct the flow of resources into their own hands, which, in turn, provided the foundation for their business empires. In fact, they did such a good job of exerting control over the allocation of government-controlled resources, that it took almost no time for this small group of highly capable entrepreneurs to transform themselves from medium-sized businessmen to industrial magnates, who, with seeming impunity, could exercise increasing control over South Korea's economy. (Elsewhere I argue that it was this quick monopolization of the economy that resulted in South Korea's abysmal economic performance in the 1950s, and not poor governmental leadership per se. In other words, South Korea's economic stagnation under Rhee was a reflection and direct consequence of the unchecked economic and social power of capital, rather than a corrupt or inefficient government.) 65 One could argue, of course, that, while this may have been true during the Rhee years, the emergence of the military-led government in 1961 changed everything. To be sure, some signific- ant changes occurred, but, as I argue, the underlying power of capital never appreciably waned during the Park years. Why? Quite simply because the military 'revolution' was far from revolutionary. That is, rather that bringing fundamental change to the country's socioeconomic system, the military regime did just the opposite: it further buttressed the position of big business. In the following and final section, I will provide some evidence to support this argument.
The Structural Power of Capital in Post-Coup Korea
Following the military coup in May 1961, one of the first major acts of the junta was to 'punish' Korea's leading capitalists/entrepreneurs; this was accomplished by arresting and then assessing large financial penalties against those found guilty of amassing 'illicit fortunes.' Ostensibly cowed by the new military regime, big business leaders pledged to abstain from further illicit activity and to devote themselves and their businesses to national reconstruction (as opposed to private gain). Lee Byung Chul (who, at the time, was South Korea's richest individual) even volunteered to donate all his properties to the government if they were deemed '. . . necessary for national reconstruction.' 66 Not surprisingly, Lee was the top name on the list of illicit fortune-makers. Besides Lee, however, the list included the owners of virtually all the leading chaebol in the country. Altogether, 44 business 'tycoons' were investigated and 27 were eventually arrested and charged with illicit accumulation; these 27 were subsequently fined a total of 48 billion hwan.
Despite the quick and seemingly stern action toward South Korea's leading capitalists/entreprenuers, the actions of the military government were, as K.D. Kim makes clear, actually quite constrained. Kim notes, for example, that 'at the outset, the junta's Supreme Council for National Reconstruction . . . went so far as to suggest that all illegally amassed fortunes be confiscated and the individual profiteers be indiscriminately executed.' 67 Yet, as Kim points out, not only were no leading capitalists executed, not a single one was even sentenced to a prison term (or banned from entrepreneurial activity, in the way that corrupt politicians were banned from political activity). Instead, most were 'allowed' to continue in their business activities as if nothing had happened. There were good reasons for this, which Kim summarizes quite well:
Above all, the junta's own future was at stake in its efforts to make the economy take off through the envisioned long-term development plans. Ironically enough, the only viable economic force for this difficult task happened to be the target group of leading entrepreneurial talents with their singular advantage of organization, personnel, facilities and capital resources. They had to be handled with care (emphasis mine.) 68 If anything, Kim understates his point: it was not only a matter of handling big business with care, but of virtually catering to their needs, if not their every whim. By October 1961, in fact, the junta had already been compelled to take a significant step backward, as those convicted of illicit fortune-making were 'authorized' to construct new plants as a means to pay designated penalities-needless to say, the financing required to build these plants had to come from the state. According to Song Yo-ch'an, who served as Prime Minister from July 1961 to June 1962, the measure was designed to give these illicit fortune-makers an opportunity 'to devote their efforts to economic development under the same conditions as other businessmen.' 69 In effect, however, it was the first of many signals that leading capitalists/entrepreneurs would soon be accorded an even more privileged position in the Korean economy. The reason, to repeat, is clear: the military regime had no other option but to rely on the large, already well-established capitalists. This was especially true in the short-run, since any meaningful attack on big business would have almost certainly led to serious economic fallout, and seriously (if not fatally) undermined the stability of the new regime. To see that the military government did not carry out such attacks is clear; to see that extant capitalists were accorded favorable treatment is also quite clear and is well reflected in the relative ranking of Korea's largest businesses at the end of Park's rule: of the 50 largest groups in 1980, 31 (62%) were established before the coup in 1961.
The constrained (and mutually dependent) nature of the Park regime's relationship with domestic capital is best reflected, perhaps, in the case of Lee Byung Chul, whose status as the country's worst illicit fortune-maker served to make him (for the remainder of the 1960s and beyond), not a target of the military regime, but a favored 68 Ibid. 69 KR, 27 October 1961. recipient of government-controlled largesse. Immediately after the coup, in fact, Lee continued to receive a large share of the country's economic resources, which he used to finance his on-going operations, 70 as well as ambitious new projects, like a massive 360,000-toncapacity fertlizer plant (which, when completed in 1967, was one of the largest fertilizer plants in the world). Still, it could be argued that Lee was simply doing what he was told to do and that he had no real control over his own enterprises, much less over governmentallocated resources. Yet, this hardly seems to have been the case. For example, it was Lee who first suggested to Park that accused businessmen be given the opportunity to build factories and 'donate' their shares to the state (instead of being subjected to real punishment). Lee, I should emphasize, made many such 'suggestions' to Park, almost all of which were followed. The 360,000-toncapacity fertilizer plant (mentioned above), in fact, was another suggestion of Lee's: after learning of the government's plan to build a series of five smaller fertilizer plants, Lee persuaded Park that a large-scale plant would be more cost-effective, and, therefore, of greater benefit to the country. Lee then promised Park that, if given the financing to build the plant, he would supply fertlizer at an internationally-competitive price (of about $72 a ton). Significantly, when the plant was completed Lee informed the government that the price had increased to $85 a ton-which was essentially the same as a government-owed plant with only one-fourth the capacity. 71 So much for economies of scale! (And so much for the government's ability to dictate the terms of economic arrangements to the country's large capitalists.)
One of Lee's most significant suggestions, however, came when he convinced the Park regime to support South Korea's fledgling export industry with generous subsidies. This, of course, flies in the face of conventional wisdom, in which it is assumed that the state took the initiative and, alone, made all the pertinent decisions regarding the country's export strategy (often over the objections of big business). But, as Clifford points out, the junta originally had no interest in developing South Korea's export potential.
72 Lee (and other major 70 Less than a year after the coup, for example, Lee secured 532 million won of outside capital to fund the expansion and modernization of his flagship company, Cheil Sugar. See Cheil chedang kongop chashik hoesa, Shim-nyon ki (Ten- capitalists), however, had a intense interest in exporting-to a significant extent, their economic survival depended on it. The reason for this is clear: beginning in the late 1950s, non-project foreign aid started a steady decline. Yet, because Lee's main manufacturing operations (in sugar, flour and woolen textiles) were entirely dependent on imported raw materials, it was imperative that he find a way to acquire foreign exchange. In other words, with the steady and seemingly irreversible decline of non-project foreign aid, Lee and other capitalists faced the bleak prospect of becoming unable to import the raw materials they needed for production. ( Table 6 shows the level of dependence on imported raw materials, while Table 7 shows the decline in non-project foreign aid for selected commodities.) From this perspective, it is easy to see that the shift to export-oriented production in South Korea was not foisted upon the country's leading capitalists, but was, instead, an eagerly anticipated and much desired benefit. Lee's 'do-as-he-pleased' attitude was also evidenced by his seemingly unbated involvement in questionable business practices: throughout the 1960s, Lee was implicated in a number of wellknown and notorious scandals. One of these involved the manipula- tion of sugar prices, which resulted in a 600% price rise and substantial (monopoly) rents for Lee's company, Cheil Sugar. Another involved Lee's massive and illegal diversion of government-allocated wheat flour, which, again, resulted in huge monopolistic profits. Still another major scandal involved the illegal importation of saccharin through none other than Korea Fertilizer Co. Yet, despite Lee's flagrant and unremitting profiteering he was never subject to serious punishment. At most, he was given a reluctant slap on the wrist and told not to do it again 73 -a suggestion that he obviously never took seriously. As I have already made clear, however, it is not difficult to see why Lee had such tremendous leeway to do as he pleased: he not only possessed a rare and extraordinarily valuable ability in the context of South Korea's post-liberation socio-economic system, but, by the time of coup, had become (through his network of companies) 74 an integral part of the Korean economy. Thus, if Park and his cohorts had severely punished Lee (and others like him)-which they certainly had the 'power' to do-they would have been cutting their own throats, so to speak. In other words, the military regime's control of Korea's economic resources meant little unless 73 In general, Lee was fined for his transgressions, although, as a result of the political fallout from the saccharin smuggling scandal, Lee agreed to hand over 51% control of Korea Fertilizer Co. to the government. Still, Lee used this to his own benefit: in handing over the company, he stated that he was doing so to contribute to 'national economic development ' (KH, 12 October 1967) .
74 By 1960, Lee's Samsung Group was composed of 13 member companies, primarily in textiles, food processing (sugar and wheat), international trade, and banking. these resources could be productively employed. But, because the military regime was unwilling radically to restructure the economy (and, thereby, risk undermining its legitimacy to govern the country), and unable productively to run the country's myriad factories itself, it had little choice but to treat Lee and other major capitalists with extreme care.
None of this is to say, however, that, on an individual level, big business 'tycoons' (including Lee) could rest easily. Because the Park-led state did control the country's financial system (as well as the 'means of violence'), when push came to shove, funds for recalcitrant firms could be cut off, or similarly harsh measures could be used to ensure compliance. For this reason, individual capitalists could clearly never afford to ignore the interests and desires of the state. Still, large capitalists did not have to fear for their survival as a class-unless, of course, the new regime decided to dispense with capitalism altogether. Barring such a truly revolutionary move, however, the country's erstwhile political capitalists remained indispensable, and, as such, the state could ill-afford to ignore their interests and desires. In short, it is fairly clear that a high degree of reciprocity-or mutual dependence-existed between the Park-led state and major capitalists: both 'sides' possessed certain powers to actto achieve their own concrete purposes-but neither side was omnipotent.
Conclusion
This paper has endeavored to show that the physical and human legacies of the colonial period need to be taken seriously in any evaluation of South Korea's social, political and economic development. The reasons, I believe, should be quite clear. To reiterate, the highly skewed development of Korea's physical and human capital during the colonial period created the conditions for the sudden emergence and extremely rapid growth of a new class of industrial elites. The rapid and virtually unchecked rise of industrial capital, in turn, quickly created a powerful, society-based counterbalance to Korea's strong state (which was, itself, another important legacy of the colonial period). Moreover, the fact that social power in South Korea did not reside entirely in the hands of the state, even after the military coup in 1961, carries with it several far-reaching implications, the most important of which is that the developmental process in South Korea was almost certainly not, as many scholars have argued, a product of efficient, unproblematic and forward-looking state planning. Rather, South Korea's economic development was more likely the result of a highly contingent and interactive political process, one in which the state may have played a key, but not causal role. Exactly how contingent and interactive this process was is open to question. While I can offer no definitive answer here, suffice it to say that-when one takes into account the social power of capital-there is ample evidence to indicate that the most important aspects of capitalist development in South Korea were subject to far less control and direction by the state than is typically assumed.
